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ABSTRACT 
The focus of this paper is a comparison of labour market regulation under the 
Employment Contracts Act 1991 and the Employment Relations Act 2000. 
Consideration is given to the objectives of the Employment Contracts Act 
1991 and the Employment Relations Act 2000, which are heralded by their 
respective creators as substantially different. The Employment Contracts Act 
1991 is proclaimed by the "new-right" as focusing largely on efficiency of 
the labour market. The Employment Relations Act 2000 has in contrast been 
promoted by the "social-left" as an Act that aims for equity by recognising 
that the employment relationship is an inherently unequal bargaining 
relationship. 
This paper asks what fundamental differences exist between the Employment 
Contracts Act 1991 and the Employment Relations Act 2000 and particularly 
whether the objectives of efficiency and equity are mutually exclusive. 
Ultimately this paper asks the question whether the equitable concepts that are 
being introduced into the labour market by the Employment Relations Act 
2000 will eliminate the efficiency elements that were introduced into the 
labour market by the Employment Contracts Act 1991? It also asks what 
impact there will be for different sectors of the labour market? In order to 
answer these questions consideration must be given to the economic agendas 
that are the basis of each Act's prescribed objective. 
The text of this paper (excluding contents page, footnotes, bibliography and 
annexures) comprises approximately 16700 words. 
I INTRODUCTION - TERMINOLOGY AND CONCEPTS 
The regulatory agenda behind the Employment Contracts Act 1991 ("ECA") 
and the Employment Relations Act 2000 ("ERA") are often portrayed as being 
in conflict with one another, with the first representing the economic goal of 
efficiency and the second the social justice goal of equity. Whether this 
juxtaposition is indeed correct and whether the two concepts of efficiency and 
equity need be considered as mutually exclusive are important questions 
because they challenge the prevalent discourse surrounding the two Acts. 
Before embarking on such an analysis, the terminology and concepts that 
make up the basis of this paper's hypothesis require introduction. 
A A Brief Introduction to the Two Acts1 
1 The ECA 
A landslide victory in the 1990 election was accepted by the National Party as 
mandate to introduce revolutionary changes to the New Zealand labour market 
by way of the ECA. The fundamental principle behind the ECA was the 
introduction of efficiency considerations into the labour market through 
recognition of the need for flexibility that had not existed in the previous 
legislation. The Long Title to the ECA stated that it is intended to "promote 
an efficient labour market" and is often referred to (though as this paper will 
discuss, not necessarily accurately) as the legislation that introduced free-
market economics to the labour market. 
1There is other legislation that significantly impacts on the labour market and it is referred to by the 
writer as the "minimum code". This includes the Holidays Act 1981, Minimum Wage Act 1983, Equal 
Pay Act 1972, Parental Leave and Employment Protection Act 1987, Wages Protection Act 1983, 
Human Rights Act 1993 and the Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992. 
2 The ERA 
Nine years after the introduction of the ECA the Labour Party has returned to 
power with coalition partner the Alliance. The repeal of the ECA was one of 
the main election platforms for the Labour Party. The objective of the ERA is 
ensuring the creation of productive employment relationships through the 
introduction of equitable considerations into the employment relationship and 
recognition of the inequality of bargaining power in the employment 
relationship. The decision to introduce equitable considerations into the 
employment relationship was in response to concerns that the solely efficiency 
orientated objective behind the ECA had resulted in considerable inequity. 
B The Labour Market 
When one party demands a good and another party supplies it, economics tells 
us that this interaction takes place in a market. In the simplest of terms a 
market amounts to a "location or situation where buyers and sellers can be in 
contact,"2 therefore the labour market is the situation where buyers and sellers 
of labour make contact. One way of thinking about the labour market is to 
consider it as "shorthand for the wide range of institutions, customs and 
personal contacts through which people are recruited for particular jobs and 
their rates ofremuneration determined."3 
1 Segmentation 
There are many different types of jobs and individuals have training and 
experience in different skills. It is proposed therefore, that it is not plausible to 
treat the labour market as a coherent whole. The labour market can be seen as 
being segmented into a variety of different sectors within which different 
demand and supply factors exist for labour. Segmentation of the labour 
2 Susan St John and James Stewart Economic Concepts and Application: The Contemporary New 
Zealand Environment (Pearson Education, Auckland, 1999) 52. 
3 Economic Monitoring Group Labour Market Flexibility Report no 7 (New Zealand Planning 
Council, Wellington, 1986) 4. 
market recognises that factors such as training, education and location mean 
that all workers in the labour market are not subject to the same factors of 
demand and supply, competition or production. While many theories of 
labour market segmentation exist, some of which deal with a multitude of 
different segments, for the purposes of this paper it is sufficient to deal with 
the most rudimentary form of labour market segmentation, the dual labour 
market. 
I The dual market and contracting out 
According to the dual labour market theory: 
the labour market can be seen as cons.isting of two sectors 
namely a primary sector and a secondary sector. The 
secondary sector ( ...... ) has jobs with low pay, employment 
insecurity, poor working conditions and so on. In contrast the 
primary sector has high wages, job security, good working 
conditions, prospects for advancement and well-defined 
administrative rules. 4 
It is often assumed that because of the training and cost involved that the 
transition from the secondary to the primary sector is a difficult one to make. 
The investment that is required in human capital to make this transition is 
costly and time consuming. 
Some in the pnmary sector find the well-defined administrative rules of 
primary employment (that those in the secondary sector seek) too restrictive. 
They wish to enjoy the freedom and financial benefits of being a self-
employed contractor, which amounts to contracting out of the upper end of the 
primary sector. In contrast the status of contractor in the secondary sector 
generally does not provide the same freedom and financial rewards and may 
be a status forced upon individuals by employers trying to avoid minimum 
4 David Sapsford and Zafiris Tzannatos The Economics of the Labour Market (MacMillan Press, 
London, 1993) 92. 
4 
code obligations. 
C Regulation 
Regulation of the labour market is intended by the writer of this paper to mean 
direct government intervention into what would otherwise be a free-market 
(where the economic forces alone control all interactions). Regulatory 
intervention is often said to take place for economic efficiency reasons or 
equitable (public interest) reasons. These two objectives are often portrayed 
as being in contrast with one another. 
1 Efficiency 
Efficiency is presented in this paper as the distribution of resources that best 
maximises the well being of society, the production of outputs at the lowest 
cost and the notion of resources being allocated to production as is required. 
One view of efficiency in the labour market context is that it is "about using 
labour resources as well as possible, about ensuring that labour services are 
used in the way which has the highest value to consumers, and thus yields the 
best possible return to the worker."5 It is significant that the notion of 
efficiency is associated in neo-classical economics with a voluntary 
transaction between two parties. As this paper goes on to discuss, there are 
some instances where the question indeed arises whether the transaction to 
undertake a contract to deliver labour services is always voluntary, due to the 
lack of available alternatives. 
2 Equity 
Equity in the context of this paper is the concept of everyone having a fair 
start through processes that do not favour certain already advantaged groups. 
It does not mean that all individuals should receive exactly the same reward 
for delivering varied levels of contribution based on different skills, 
experience and expertise. Therefore the writer feels it is acceptable to 
5 Penelope Brook Freedom at Work- The Case for Reforming Labour Law in New Zealand (Oxford 
University Press, Auckland, 1990) 48. 
interchange the terminology of equity and fairness but insists that equity 
should not be confused with equality of outcome. Equity can be seen to 
amount to fairness in process or an equal opportunity and while the notion of 
equity reaches into the concept of getting a fair division of the gains from 
trade, it does not represent the goal of equality of outcome for all parties to a 
transaction. A fairer division of the gains from trade sees distribution of the 
gains from the employment relationship more fairly, though not equally, 
distributed between the employer and employee. Equitable policy goals are 
commonly associated with the left wing of the political spectrum. 
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II THE EQUITY/ EFFICIENCY TRADE-OFF 
The equity/efficiency trade-off is the model often used to describe the equity 
and efficiency content of market regulation and can be represented 
diagrammatically as in Table One below. By posing the two concepts on 
opposing axis, the equity and efficiency content of regulation can be plotted in 
terms of the trade-off that is made. 
Efficiency 
C Frontier 
Equity 
Table One: The Efficiency/Equity Trade-off 
A The Equity/Efficiency Frontier 
The curve represents a "frontier [ and] at a point such as A, the economy is 
highly efficient but there is a very unequal distribution of income so that equity 
is low. To improve equity and achieve a point like B, income must be 
transferred and in the process some efficiency is lost. Equity gains are at the 
expense of efficiency. As more and more equity is pursued, the steepness of 
the efficiency/equity frontier as the efficiency costs become higher and 
higher. "6 Therefore regulation that takes place on the frontier is where the 
concepts of equity and efficiency are mutually exclusive. 
6 St John, above n2, 250. 
I Opposites attract 
It is the writer's contention that the posing on these two concepts in opposition 
to one another, as takes place at the frontier, does not accurately reflect the 
manner in which equity and efficiency considerations are represented in labour 
market regulation. There are, the writer proposes, instances where equity is 
gained through efficiency and vice versa, without any actual trade-off taking 
place. Therefore the writer proposes that a point within the equity/efficiency 
frontier such as point C can represent where "it should be possible to have 
more of both equity and efficiency."7 It is somewhere within the frontier that 
the writer proposes that the equity/efficiency content of the ECA and ERA can 
be found. 
2 Opposites are Opposites 
However, many seem to support the mutually exclusive nature of the two 
concepts, suggesting that regulation only exists on the frontier. Bonner who 
holds this type of view has stated that "economists ... extol the efficiency of 
markets but are less enthusiastic about their equity. Efficiency is apparently 
compatible with a great deal of inequality."8 It is this type of black and white 
- approach to the equity/efficiency trade off that creates a discourse surrounding 
regulation that assumes there can only be either an economic or a social policy 
goal represented in regulation, not both. 
B Rhetoric and Reality 
Much political rhetoric clouds the debate around regulation of the labour 
market and the writer suggests that the equity/efficiency trade-off is a 
significant, though not necessarily explicitly acknowledged, part of that 
rhetoric. The writer proposes that the debate surrounding the ECA and ERA is 
fuelled by rhetoric reflective of the two most extreme ends of the 
7 St John, above n2, 250. 
8 John Bonner Politics, Economics and Welfare: An Elementary Introduction to Social Choice 
(Harvester Press, Sussex, 1986) 111. 
efficiency/equity trade-off (Points A and B). It is in using the extreme ends of 
the efficiency/equity trade off that politicians find the most powerful language 
and concepts through which to influence the general public. 
1 Sweatshops are efficient 
The Labour party has regularly made reference to the powerful image of the 
re-emergence of sweatshops in New Zealand. With the emotive image of 14 
Thai women in New Zealand being required to undertake work for little pay 
and in harsh conditions in the forefront of the public's mind, Margaret Wilson 
has said that "this situation is untenable and can not be allowed to take hold in 
New Zealand. The [Employment Relations] Bill attempts to deter such 
abusive processes."9 The implication is that the ECA and its free-market 
orientated efficiency goals have allowed or encouraged sweatshops to re-
emerge and that the harsh conditions and less than minimum pay are the result 
of the free-market efficiency orientated approach to the labour market. 
Economic arguments can in fact be made that sweatshops are efficient because 
the transaction may indeed represent an allocatively efficient result that is 
welfare enhancing for both parties. 10 However what is not mentioned when 
- these images of sweatshops are referred to, is the fact that what is actually 
being breached is the minimum code, rather than this happening because of an 
action that is facilitated under the ECA. The writer suggests that the 
sweatshop image is borrowed directly from the efficiency extreme of the 
equity/efficiency trade-off frontier (where there would be no regulation for 
minimum wages or standards). This type of all efficiency no equity approach 
represented by Point A of the frontier is a situation that should not exist in 
New Zealand because of the existence of the minimum code. 
9 ERB Frequently Asked Questions <http://www.labour.org. nz/erb2stmt. html> (last accessed 20 July 
2000). 
10 See Rawls in E Zajac Political Economy of Fairness (MIT Press, United States of America, 1994) 
82, where Zajac has pointed to Rawls' view that Pareto-efficient states can be prima facie unjust and 
that "it may be that under certain conditions serfdom can not be significantly reformed without 
lowering the expectations of the representative man , say [those] that of land owners, in which case 
serfdom is efficient." 
2 Fairness is a return to the Jurassic era11 
The other side of the debate is the rhetoric suggesting that the introduction of 
equity considerations into the labour market by the ERA will mean economic 
ruin for New Zealand. The words of National Party MP Annabel Young 
articulated this view when she stated that: 
the biggest worry is that the Employment Relations Bill does not 
reflect what goes on in workplaces today. It is written in a 
bygone era. The Bill would be okay for a New Zealand where 
we didn't have to play a role on the world stage, where 
technology innovation and enterprise were the domain of a few 
and where doing business and doing it well didn't depend on 
enterprise and flexibility to respond to change. 12 
There have been cries that the economy will be ruined, that big businesses 
will go to Australia and that smaller businesses will simply collapse under the 
financial pressure of the obligations created by the introduction of equity 
considerations by the ERA. These arguments appear to be fuelled by an 
assumption that the ERA in fact comes from the most extreme equity end of 
the equity/efficiency trade-off frontier. It is suggested that the ECA 
"subordinate[ s] efficiency considerations to demands for security and 
equality of outcome." 13 It is the writer's contention that this rhetoric is once 
again borrowed from the equity extreme of the trade-off, which does not 
accurately reflect the intent, and effect of the ERA. 
11 See the National Party website on the Employment Relations Bill called "Walking with Dinosaurs" 
at <http: //www.dinosaur.org.nzJerbsummarv.hrm > (last accessed 8 March 2000). 
12 Brookers Employment News Service ERB means Tougher Times for Local Businesses: National 
Claims 20 April 2000. 
13 Wolfgang Kasper Freedom to Work: The Liberation of New Zealand's Labour Market (The Centre 
for Independent Studies, St Leonards) 22. 
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III A FREE LABOUR MARKET 
To make a full companson of the equitable and efficiency reasons for 
intervention in the labour market consideration must first be given to what a 
free labour market would look like. The "new right" with its preference for 
economic liberalism has embraced the vision of a free-market economy as a 
means of achieving efficiency. According to the most extreme "new-right" 
view, labour should be traded as a commodity in the market without any 
intervention, meaning that the wage would be determined by response to 
supply and demand, competition and economic factors alone. There are few 
however from the "new-right" that would say that the labour market should be 
left completely to its own devices because of existing market failures that lead 
to inefficiencies. Regulation of the labour market takes place from an 
efficiency point of view to address the following market failures. 
A The Assumption of Full Information 
It 1s not realistic to assume that parties in the labour market have full 
information as the neo-classical model of an efficient free-market suggests. 
The reality is that there are information asymmetries that exist for both the 
- supplier and demander of labour. 
1 The demander 
Demanders of labour do not necessarily know what is available by way of 
supply in the market. When it comes to purchasing labour they are not aware 
of the experience and expertise of the supplier offering their services other than 
what they are told by them. The way that the market has dealt with this 
information asymmetry without state regulation is through the practice of the 
provision of curriculum vitaes and referees to allow the demander to determine 
the suitability of the supplier for the position. There has also been the 
establishment of agencies to provide verifiable information about those that are 
available. 
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2 The supplier 
A supplier is unaware of the culture and nature of an organisation, the way that 
they will be treated within it and a variety of other details when they accept to 
deliver their services to an organisation. Not unlike a consumer of a good or 
service, suppliers of labour are not always aware of the details of the 
bargaining they are entering into. Therefore there is focus in regulation on 
providing mechanisms that address the information asymmetry for the supplier. 
Health and safety in employment legislation is one example of this type of 
regulation. A worker entering into the working environment is unable to know 
exactly how safe the environment is, largely because they would not have the 
skills and expertise to test the environment before working there. Health and 
safety legislation means workers need not be at an information disadvantage, 
because the employer has an obligation at law to ensure certain minimum 
standards are met. 
B Complete Mobility 
The neo-liberal economic model of an efficient free-market suggests that there 
is complete mobility amongst those in the market, however there are several 
reasons why there is not complete mobility in the labour market. One of these 
relates to the issue of segmentation of the labour market. In the secondary 
segment there are problems in making the transition to the primary segment of 
the market because of the training and time required to make the transition. 
There is also the issue of geographical location that may mean that certain 
individuals are not able to follow the demand for their skills because it requires 
considerable cost or is simply not feasible in relation to their living and family 
situation. An economic model of mobility considers only the supplier of 
labour and does not take into account factors such as family members and 
social obligations. 
It is notable once again that those in the secondary market are restricted in 
terms of segment mobility and are more likely to be geographically immobile 
because of the lower wages associated with the secondary market. The 
pnmary market, it can be argued, is more mobile because there is the 
assumption of more available cash-flow secured from better wages and an 
ability to move more freely within the primary segment to follow demand. 
C Competition 
The efficient market model of neo-liberal economics 1s characterised by 
competition between many buyers and many sellers. Many buyers and sellers 
do not exist in any one segment of the market at any one time. 
I The buyer's bargaining power 
A buyer has more bargaining power if they are in a situation where they are 
the only, or one of only a few, buyers of labour. The buyer in the strongest 
bargaining position is in a monopsony situation where they are the single 
buyer of labour. Bargaining power can increase through lack of competition 
from other buyers. This increase in bargaining power for those without 
competitors may impact on the immobile secondary sector more harshly than 
the primary market. The immobility of the secondary work force both 
geographically and between segments is going to mean that this group is more 
susceptible to limited buyer scenarios. The buyer's power increases still 
further if there is an oversupply of suppliers amongst whom there will be 
competition. 
2 The supplier 's bargaining power 
On the other extreme are situations where there are a few heavily in demand 
labourers and large constraints of supply. The most extreme situation is where 
there is only one supplier of a certain type of labour and there is considerable 
demand, amounting to a monopoly. This is an unlikely situation but there are 
situations in speciality areas where there are only a few suppliers of a certain 
type of labour available and a monopoly type situation may exist. In such a 
situation it is suppliers that have the bargaining power. 
1:$ 
It is the writer's view that it is significantly more likely that bargaining power 
through constraint of supply is likely to take place in the primary market 
where specialist training and expertise are more likely to be developed. 
However in relation to the secondary market, suppliers may gain some control 
through reducing competition between suppliers through collective bargaining. 
By removing competition amongst workers collective bargaining creates a 
stronger bargaining position to enable control of the supply of labour. 
14 
IV EQUITABLE REASONS FOR INTERVENING IN THE FREE 
LABOUR MARKET 
There are two main objections to free-market economics being applied to the 
labour market, which make up the basis of the equitable reasons for 
intervention. One is the argument that labour is not a commodity like others 
traded in markets, because of the human nature of the relationship and the 
social significance of the wage. The second is that the market does not 
adequately address the inherent inequality in the bargaining relationship 
between employees and employers. These equitable interventions reflect a 
dynamic long-run perspective on the labour market rather than a short-run 
analysis. 
A Social Justice 
Equitable reasons for government intervention in the labour market are often 
connected with what Brook refers to as "social justice." 14 A "social justice" 
approach to the labour market suggests that there must be fairness in the 
allocation of the gains from trade, not just equity of opportunity. This amounts 
to recognition of inequity of opportunity in the differing parties' starting 
-positions, something economics does not do, as well as fairness in division of 
the gains from trade. Many do not support a view that takes into account the 
original endowments of the parties as justification for equitable outcomes, 
including Hayek who expressed the view that: 
14 Brook above n5, 8. 
the classical demand is that the State ought to treat all 
people equally inspite of the fact that they are very 
unequal. You can ' t deduct from this the rule that because 
people are unequal you ought to treat them unequally in 
order to make them equal, and that is what social justice 
amounts to. 15 
15 FR Hayek Television Program "Firing Line" (11 November 1997) in Zajac above nlO, 79. 
1!> 
Brook argues that the introduction of "social justice" reasoning m labour 
market regulation arose because of the view that "the unpredictable and often 
unfortunate outcomes of the market should be controlled and corrected by 
values embodied in a more ethically pleasing end state."16 The popularity of 
the approach was in Brook's view supported by the immediacy of impact that 
direct State intervention could provide and the ability to plan ahead. 
B Labour, is it a Commodity? 
It is the writer' s starting proposition, m considering whether labour 1s a 
commodity, that: 
Labour is a factor of production - but a worker is a human 
being and his work involves social as well as technical 
relations. Work is not merely the way to get a living, but a 
way of life, a game or a thraldom, a field of conflicts and 
loyalties, anxieties and reassurances, prestige and humiliation 
... the occupation and social structures are interlocked.17 
Traditionally economists and politicians have viewed labour as something 
quite different from other commodities in that it should not be left the subject 
of voluntary transactions in markets. The: 
prevailing traditional philosophy of governance in virtually all 
Western ' mixed economies ' has long asserted that labour markets 
are special and different from markets for other production factors 
and products, in that the price (the wage) has great social impact. 
It was concluded that the labour market should not be left to the 
vagaries of the market process and that labour should not be 
treated as a commodity. 18 
16 NP Barry The Invisible Hand in Economics and Politics (Institute of Economics Affairs, London, 
1988) 41-42 . 
17 Henry Phelps Brown in Brook, above n5 , 11. 
18 Kasper, above n13, 22 . 
11:5 
Only a few weeks before the ERA became law Margaret Wilson stated that 
"New Zealanders do not want their workplaces to be market places. They do 
not want their labour to [be] bought and sold as if it were a commodity."
19 
This statement is based on the belief that the commodity under transaction, the 
labour of an individual, is part of a social relationship between two people that 
is ongoing and has a considerable impact on the remainder of the individual's 
life. Labour and the wage it produces are according to this view, the source of 
not only meeting personal needs but also improving quality of life. The 
reluctance to treat labour as a commodity amounts to a fear that if left to the 
determination of the market, that the wage will sink to a "dehumanising 
level"20 because no human factors are taken into account. 
I The market determination of the wage 
The demand for labour in a market can be largely attributed to two things, the 
demand for goods and services by consumers and the productivity of the 
workforce. The supply of labour is largely driven by the size of the 
workforce, within New Zealand or increasingly globally, and the ability of 
individuals to participate in the work force due to restrictions such as the 
school leaving age. A standard labour market supply and demand curve is set 
out in Table Two. 
Wage Rate 
w 
s 
D 
Q Labour Units 
Table Two: Supply of Demand and Labour with Equilibrium 
19 Hon Margaret Wilson Address to New Zealand Engineers, Printing and Manufacturing Union 
Biennial Conference (Quality Hotel Logan Park, 28 July 2000). 
20 Brook, above n5, 13 . 
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The market supply curve (S) moves upwards for left to right while the demand 
curve (D) goes up from right to left. The point where supply and demand meet 
is the equilibrium and it is at this point where the market determines the wage 
and the quantity of labour. 
(a) The wage in the dual labour market 
Taking the dual labour market that is the focus of this paper into account there 
will be two equilibrium points as demonstrated in Table Three. 
Wage Rate S Prim 
WPrim 
WSec 
QPrim Q Sec Labour Units 
Table Three: Wage Equilibrium in Dual Labour Market 
(b) Equilibrium below subsistence level 
The concern of those who do not support the wage being determined by the 
market is that the equilibrium for demand and supply will sink below the level 
of human subsistence. The "new-right" response is that the demander of 
labour has a real incentive to increase wages above the equilibrium because of 
competition in the market. In a free-market it is assumed a demander of 
labour will be forced to increase wages by the threat that those supplying 
labour may be drawn to supply their services elsewhere. Competition, 
Hl 
according to market theorists, will ensure that wages will not sink to a 
dehumanising level, though as discussed above, competition does not always 
exist. In recognition of this fact the majority of those in the "new-right" in 
fact support the introduction of minimum wage legislation. 
2 Minimum wage legislation 
Minimum wage legislation in New Zealand acts to ensure that those in the 
secondary market who may be subject to over-supply and lowered demand, get 
a liveable wage rather than the wage determined by the supply and demand 
equilibrium of the market model. From the nee-classical economic point of 
view the demander of labour treats the minimum wage as a marginal cost that 
directly effects the quantity of labour employed. 
(a) Cereal and marginal cost 
The Chief Executive of Hubbards recently expressed the view that the wage 
impacts on the quantity of labour units used, in a slightly different context. He 
stated that: 
at Hubbard Foods we are passionate about creating jobs. Lots of 
them! As a result, our manning rates are quite high. We employ 
90 people in our factory floor alone- similar sized cereal 
processing companies here and overseas would only employ 25 
to 30 people ..... However to achieve this, we can only afford to 
pay mid rates of pay. Of course we could pay higher rates of pay 
if we dropped our manning rates. 
21 
The suggestion is that an increase in quantity means a decrease in wages and 
vice versa. How the minimum wage impacts on labour quantity in a similar 
manner is demonstrated diagrammatically in Table Four, where the equilibrium 
21 Dick Hubbard Hubbards Clipboard 47 "Did the Wheels Come off at Hubbard Food Ltd" (Auckland) 
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point where demand (D) and supply (S) meet can be compared with the new 
equilibrium created by the minimum wage intersecting with the demand curve. 
Wage Rate s 
Min Wage 
D 
Ql Q2 Labour Units 
Labour1eduction 
Table Four: The Effect of the Minimum Wage on Secondary Market 
It can be seen that the point where the minimum wage meets the demand curve 
(D) is a point where the quantity of labour (Q) required is reduced from Q2 where 
the market equilibrium is to Q 1. According to the graph, the quantity of labour 
used will need to be reduced to counteract the increase in wage above the market 
equilibrium. 
(b) A South African example 
An example of this has recently taken place in South Africa where the African 
National Congress came into force on 1994 and enacted a series of laws requiring 
firms to treat their workers generously including increases in the minimum wage. 
It was "a disaster. Faced with soaring labour costs employers slashed their work 
forces. More than 500,000 jobs have vanished since 1994. Perhaps one third of 
the labour force is out of work. Unskilled workers have become so costly that 
bosses tie themselves in knots to avoid hiring them. "22 
22 "Pay Packets"(2000) 356 The Economist, 45, 45. 
( c) The left wing and dead fish 
Left-wing commentators such as Tim Hazeldine have spoken about the 
dehumanising effects of free-market wage determination and he has lobbied for 
an increased minimum wage. He sees the application of market forces to the 
determination of the wage as an exercise in treating human beings the same as 
"dead fish" and suggests that "you can build a dead fish model for yourself. ... 
Simply take a piece of paper and rule on it a box. Label the vertical sides of 
the box "price" (such as the price fetched per kilogram of fish) , and the 
horizontal "quantity" (total number of kilograms moved through the 
market) . "23 
Hazeldine does not agree that that an increase m m1mmum wage need be 
treated as a marginal cost that has a direct effect on the quantity of labour used 
or creates a surplus of unemployed. In Hazeldine' s view the cost of increased 
wages can be countered by efficiencies in other areas, which may lead to 
increased production. This view is in conflict with what has actually 
happened in South Africa but it must be noted that the jobs that have been lost 
there as a result of the minimum wage have been largely domestic, meaning 
there is no opportunity to gain efficiencies in other areas as there may be in 
other industries. 
C Bargaining Power 
Another social-justice argument for not treating labour as a tradable 
commodity in the free-market, is the inequitable bargaining relationship 
between the employee and employer. 
23 Tim Hazeldine "You Can ' t Treat Workers like Dead Fish" New Zealand Herald, Auckland, New 
Zealand, 20 December 1996 in St John and Stewart, above n2, 91. 
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1 Bargaining power and competing for gains from trade 
What then does it mean to say that there is an inherently unequal bargaining 
relationship between an employer and employer and what is the basis of this 
assumption? 
(a) A fair share of the national cake 
Knox has articulated one view of the effect of inequitable bargaining power 
when he stated that: 
as a result of the gross inequities of power in our society, the 
last few years have seen a decline in working people's share 
of the national cake. The beneficiaries of this decline are the 
large companies and the record profits and those companies 
have made in the last few years have been expanded on 
increased dividends to shareholders and a consolidation of 
corporate ownership within the economy i.e. increasing 
monopolisation. The free market policies of recent times have 
accentuated this process of increased profit and 
monopolisation.24 
The suggestion 1s that there is likely to be exploitation of employees if 
employers are not restrained in some way from their self-maximising 
behaviour and that unequal bargaining power results in an inability to get a fair 
share of the "national cake." The idea that the employers interest in securing 
the best gains from trade are posed in the bargaining balance against the 
employee is strongest in the secondary market where the employee is more 
immobile, both geographically and segmentationally, meaning suppliers' 
bargaining power is further reduced. 
24 W.J Knox Looking Ahead: A More Just Industrial Relations System (New Zealand Federation of 
Labour, 1987) 2. 
(b) A fair share of the pizza 
An example of this type of situation is drivers at Pizza Hut who are treated as 
contractors rather than workers. They have stated that "most of us can't even 
afford to make our cars road-legal. .. this is a blatant case of Pizza Hut using its 
new found position in the market to make even more profits at our expense."
25 
The delivery driver has suggested that Pizza Hut's new position of market 
power (gained because they have recently bought out one of the major 
competitors) has made the bargaining power between employer and contractor 
more iniquitous. However the driver then goes on to make the point that "we 
all know that Pizza Hut is finding it hard to get drivers, and is it any 
wonder?"26 This suggests that there is some competition, possibly outside the 
pizza delivery business, and that the drivers are selling their skills to that 
competition. Therefore competition strengthens the bargaining position of the 
drivers but arguably it is not considerably strengthened if they continue with 
the same inability to secure a fair share of the gains from trade. 
2 Bargaining power and the accessibility to other buyers 
As discussed above, the employee's bargaining power may not be less than that 
- of their employer if they have the option of going to a competitor to sell their 
services. However lack of competition and immobility in the labour market 
mean this is not always possible. In theory at least, it can be argued that an 
employee has as much bargaining power as there is competition for their 
labour. In reality and in some parts of the labour market there may be only a 
few demanders of labour and an oversupply of suppliers. It is the writer's 
contention that this type of situation indeed exists in rural towns in New 
Zealand where the less skilled secondary market has only one or two options of 
where to sell their labour such as the local mill or factory. In this situation, 
25 Jonathan Milne "Pizza Couriers Plan Blue Flu Action Over Pay" (Wednesday 23 August 2000) 
Dominion 14. This is a particularly interesting example because of the reference to the roadworthiness 
of the vehicles. Pizza Hutt has avoided health and safety obligations and other minimum standards by 
not treating the drivers as employees. 
26 Milne, above n25 , 14. 
where there is a lack of competition, it is the writer's belief that there would 
clearly be an inequity in the bargaining power. 
There are many social factors that may limit an individual's mobility including 
their broader family considerations, something the market model does not take 
into account, as well as their desire to move, ownership of property in that 
area, tradition, or other non-economic reasons for remaining in the area. 
Therefore there may be a number of social reasons why this is not desirable or 
in fact feasible to move to meet demand. The social realities of immobility 
present some dynamic long-run arguments for equitable regulation aimed at 
empowering employees through the collective or the introduction of 
compulsory awards across industries. Historically regulation for equitable 
reasons took place to address the inherently unequal bargaining power in a 
blanket fashion. This meant that what was applicable to those in one industry 
in Auckland was applicable to those in the same type of industry in Bluff. 
Such intervention was aimed at eliminating the effects of lack of competition 
in certain areas on the bargaining power of the potentially immobile employee. 
3 Bargaining Power and Constraints of Supply 
There are also situations where available supply may not be able to meet the 
growing demand. This means the employee may in fact have the strongest 
bargaining power. This has been the case in the computer industry in New 
Zealand where it is the employee who can call the shots and has the stronger 
bargaining position because there is a huge demand for their labour and a 
genuine shortage of qualified and experienced workers. The situation in the 
computer industry is likely to eventually change when a surplus of suppliers is 
reached and overcomes the demand. However currently it could be said that 
because of the shortage of supply they hold the bargaining power and can 
therefore drive their wage above the equilibrium that would exist if adequate 
competition existed. The balance of the bargaining power being in favour of 
the employee in this situation is not necessarily inequitable because both 
parties may continue to get a fair division of the gains from trade. However 
having the bargaining power in the complete control of the employee may 
result in inefficiencies because the distribution, production and allocation of 
resources may not take place efficiently. 
4 Collective bargaining can readdress the imbalance 
State recognition of collective bargaining in labour market regulation can be 
seen as directly addressing the inherent imbalance in the employment 
relationship. Posner states that "the primary purpose of a union is to control 
the supply of labour so that their employer can not use competition among 
individual labourers to keep down the price of labour."
27 Regulating for 
unions and collective bargaining amounts to removal of the competition 
between employees who may be able to compete more aggressively by 
accepting lower wages. 
Regulatory recognition of the collective group means that a wage rate can be 
set which is applicable to the collective group and therefore employers can not 
use competition between individual employees to force down the wage. 
Collective bargaining also redresses the bargaining power imbalance in that it 
counteracts the information asymmetry that can exist between employee and 
employer. As a collective group the total sum of the group is going to be 
considerably broader and more extensive than the knowledge of the single 
employee. The collective may also be better equipped than the individual to 
collect new as well as retain historical information. These efficiency goals 
are also equitable goals because they represent a better balance of the 
bargaining power for the individual through the collective and the increased 
chance of a fairer distribution of the gains from trade. 
27 Richard Posner The Economics of the Law (Little Brown and Company, Boston, 1977) 239 . 
V A COMMON OR LABOUR LAW? 
A The Common Law Approach 
If you assume, as the new-right do, that labour is no different from any other 
tradable commodity it can also be assumed that there is no need for a specialist 
jurisdiction of labour law or a specialist labour court to regulate the 
transactions that take place within that market. Notably however, even those in 
full support of the Common Law being used to facilitate labour market 
transactions have acknowledged that: 
as a substantive matter, the defen[ c ]e of a common law system is 
not an assertion that the "market" can handle every social 
problem. The law of property and the law of torts are strictly 
required in order to establish the framework of original rights in 
which voluntary transactions can take place.28 
Epstein said "in speaking of "the" common law, I am referring to the best set 
of private law rules that can be devised to handle the problems of labour 
relations."29 According to his view, having a specialist labour law encroaches 
- not only on the liberty of the individual but also the entire democratic 
tradition.30 This is because he assumes that the individual should be free to 
enter into a contract as they see fit without the dictation of terms from a State 
generated labour law, which tends to support collectivism and equitable non-
efficient ends. 
1 Contracts of Employment 
The entering into of an employment contract is a significant notion because 
28 Richard Epstein "A Common Law for Labo[u]r Relations: A Critique of the New Deal 
Labo[u]r Legislation" 92 YLJ 1359 ["A Common Law for Labo[u]r Relations"]. 
29 "A Common Law for Labo[u]r Relations", above n28, 1359. 
30 Rose Ryan and Pat Walsh Common Law versus Labour Law: the Debate over the future of the 
Specialist Institutions (Industrial Relations Centre Working Paper 2/93, Wellington) 1993. 
the contract represents the terms agreed by the parties alone. That 1s 
significant because: 
it was only comparatively recently that such legislation began 
to take its effect by conferring on the workers contractual 
rights, which could not be abrogated to their detriment. The 
normal pattern of protection was through the law of tort or 
through special statutory rights unconnected with the contract 
of employment.31 
The Common Law view assumes that there is little or no need for government 
intervention in the employment relationship, because "a labour law regime 
based on the notion of freely contracting parties entering into binding 
agreements appear[s] to rule out a major role for the State in regulating the 
process of contract management. "32 
If there are disputes about the interpretation and application of the contract 
then these will be considered and ruled upon by the general courts in terms of 
the law of contract, therefore focusing on the terms agreed by the parties. 
Possible transaction costs are averted because the contract contains clauses 
_ reflecting how the parties thought best to resolve the issues. Epstein marked 
the significance of the employment contract in this regard when he said that: 
I quite agree with the view that a labour contract is not the same as 
a contract for the sale of baked beans. But the parties to a labour 
contract already know that. When I work, the title for my person 
does not transfer from a seller to a buyer. The difference between 
the case lies in the terms of respective contracts express and 
implied. 33 
31 Otto Kahn-Freund "Blackstone's Neglected Child: The Contract of Employment" 93 LQR, 508, 
524. 
32 Harbridge, above n7, 18. 
33 Richard Epstein Employment Law: Courts and Contracts (New Zealand Business Round Table, 
Wellington, 1996) 4 [Employment Law: Courts and Contracts]. 
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2 Specialist Labour Institutions 
Before the ECA was enacted Treasury was of the view that there should be no 
specialist labour institutions meaning there would be no development of 
precedents relating specifically to labour relations that created implied terms. 
Treasury "argued that, as far, as possible, labour law should be embedded 
within the general law as it applied to contracts rather than leaving in place a 
specialist body of labour law and specialist institutions."34 One gains the 
impression that Treasury was concerned that the effect of specialist labour 
institutions would be to introduce too many equitable and collective 
considerations and that precedents would develop that would restrict and 
regulate the contracting parties as implied terms. 
B The Specialist Labour Law Approach 
According to those in support of specialist labour law and institutions, namely 
the social-left, not only should specialist labour laws exist to ensure essential 
terms are not excluded from contacts of employment, but specialist institutions 
are also required to deal with the interpretation of contracts of employment and 
the specialist labour law under which they are developed. 
The view m support of government intervention through the creation of a 
specialist labour law and institutions can be seen as equitable because it is 
often enacted to support the collective group which provides the individuals 
within it with more bargaining power. Those who support the development of 
a specialist labour law believe the individual nature of the Common Law 
approach creates a presumption against collectivism and collective bargaining. 
Kahri-Freund holds the view that the Common Law knows nothing about the 
balance of collective forces, in his view, "it operates between individuals and 
not otherwise."35 In fact the Common Law is largely hostile to collectivism 
34 Raymond Harbridge Employment Contracts: New Zealand Experiences (Victoria University Press, 
Wellington, 1993)21. 
35 Paul Davies and Mark Freeland Kahn-Freund's Labour and the Law (Stevens and Sons, London, 
1983)13. 
and without intervention it creates real barriers to collective bargaining.
36 
Historically labour law legislation has been enacted to support collectivism and 
specifically allow for state intervention both in prescribing terms and 
obligations as well as establishing specialist institutions. Specialist labour 
courts have existed in recognition of the fact that there are certain issues 
surrounding employment contracts that require specialist consideration. 
36 Examples of the common law' s hostility to collective bargaining, namely trade unions, are the 
criminal action of conspiracy and tort of interference with economic action. 
VI A BRIEF HISTORY OF LABOUR LAW IN NEW ZEALAND 
Historically the three main areas of State intervention have been in relation to 
compulsory unionism, arbitration and awards. For New Zealand the intervention 
of the State in the labour market began near the end of the nineteenth century 
when "New Zealand was viewed by the world as a progressive social 
laboratory. "3 7 
A The Beginnings 
In New Zealand in the 1880s and movmg into the 1890s there was 
considerable labour market reform. 
1 Conditions of Employment 
The first Factories Act was enacted in 1891 and was a step towards the 
development of a cohesive health and safety regime. A Shops Act covering 
minimum hours was enacted and legislation slowly developed to protect 
women and children in the workplace, starting with the Employment of 
Females Act 1873. Health and safety legislation continued to grow in a 
haphazard fashion right through the twentieth century until 1992 when 
numerous Acts such as the Miners Act 1970, and the Boilers, Lifts and Cranes 
Act 1950 were merged into the broad obligations of the health and Safety in 
Employment Act 1992. The New Zealand Department of Labour was 
established in 1891 under the name of the Bureau of Industries and its aim was 
not only to try and facilitate the unemployed into work but also to try and 
ensure that minimum standards were being met. 
2 The Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1894 
The most significant labour legislation from this era was the Industrial 
Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1894 ("ICA Act"), which introduced 
37 Harbridge, above n34, 7. 
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compulsory conciliation and arbitration into labour relations. Under the ICA 
Act unions were registered and "the statute sought to encourage the 
philosophy of collectivism."38 It is of some consequence that the ICA Act was 
enacted at a time of economic turmoil in NZ and that it prohibited strikes and 
lockouts during arbitration and in direct response to strikes of the preceding 
era. The economic depression of the years before had meant wages had 
dropped and in response there had been a reaction of union militancy that in 
tum lead to the suppression of unions to the point where "from 1890 to 1894 
unions in New Zealand nearly ceased to exist."39 The ICA Act regulated the 
registration of union members and: 
bargaining rights and access to the state-supported 
mechanism of conciliation and arbitration, with resultant 
coverage of minimum terms and conditions of employment 
contained in awards and agreements, were conferred on 
registered organisations, and state provided enforcement 
mechanisms underpinned the standards thus established. A 
system of preference for unionists evolved into a legislative 
basis for compulsory unionism, providing substance for the 
contemporary political debate on compulsory unionism and 
freedom of association . 40 
Incredibly the compulsory arbitration and collective bargaining framework 
created by the ICA Act remained largely unchanged for some 90 years. The 
ICA Act did not in fact stipulate compulsory unionism rather "unions could 
demand a clause in their award compelling employers to hire union members 
in preference to non-union members where equally qualified union members 
where available."41 It wasn' t until the 1930s, the time of the next economic 
depression, that labour law saw further change. In 1932 the compulsory 
arbitration set up by the ICA Act was abolished, but then it was enacted into 
38 Harbridge, above n34, 7. 
39 Ellen J Dann in Working Free: The Origins and Impact of New Zealand Employment Contracts Act 
(Auckland University Press, Auckland, 1997) 13 . 
40 Harbridge, above n34, 8. 
4 1 Brook, above n5 , 22. 
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legislation agam m 1936 by the same legislation that made umomsm 
compulsory. New Zealand had become a member of the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) since its formation in 1919 as a tripartite group of 
employer, worker and government bodies. 
B Things Start to Change 
In 1973 the Industrial Relations Act was passed and recognised a distinction 
between disputes of interest and disputes of rights. Then came the Industrial 
Relations (Amendment) Act 1984, which introduced a minimal amount of 
voluntarism into what was historically a compulsory agenda. This however 
was limited and amounted only to a requirement that parties had to agree to 
take disputes to arbitration rather than being compelled to do so as had always 
previously been the case. These changes though taking place slowly, did 
eventually amount to a considerable change, but the philosophy of 
collectivism remained. That is except for the National party's abolition of 
compulsory unionism on 1983, a short-lived exercise, as the law was quickly 
reverted by the Labour government's return to power the following year. 
C The Labour Relations Act 1987 
In 1987 the Labour Relations Act was enacted at a time when there were in 
existence some 383 awards and approximately 200 unions.42 The Labour 
Relations Act 1987 ("LRA") reflected a change in attitude and in sl 32(a) 
allowed Unions to "cite out" and remove an employer from an industry award 
allowing what was known as enterprise bargaining. Despite this mechanism 
few employers and unions undertook enterprise bargaining. 
42 Oannin, above n39, 14. 
VII THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS ACT AND THE OBJECT OF 
EFFICIENCY 
It was the view of the National party in 1990 that the "comprehensive micro-
economic liberalisation"43 that had taken place since the reforms initiated by the 
Labour Government in 1984, was restricted by the heavily regulated labour 
market. The National Party manifesto for the 1990 election attacked the concepts 
behind the LRA as moderate and claimed that it was "constraining employers and 
employees from developing their own specific labour relations policies, and 
consequently restricting growth in productivity, income and employment."44 The 
industrial policy of the National Party before the 1990 election portrayed 5 basic 
principles, which were: 
(1) Voluntary Unionism 
(2) A choice of bargaining structure 
(3) Agreements that amounted to binding contracts 
(4) Access to Dispute resolution 
(5) Minimum Code for safety 
A To Promote an Efficient Labour Market 
The National Party had a desire to "promote an efficient labour market" and to 
do so through introducing flexibility. Flexibility would allow for adaptability 
to all situations and response to the demands of the market. The idea behind 
the ECA was that it would unshackle the labour market and allow individuals 
to reach agreement on terms without the type of State intervention that had 
historically existed, including the State dictated terms of compulsory 
unionism, arbitration and industry wide awards. 
However introducing flexibility, according to the ECA' s critics, would amount 
to "a revised system of legal regulation which favoured employers and 
43 Kasper, above n 13 , I. 
44 Harbridge, above n34, 16. 
disadvantaged workers. "45 In other words it would provide efficiency through 
flexibility but work to disadvantage workers because it did not promote 
equitable goals such as collective bargaining which improved bargaining 
power. 
The ECA can not be said to represent a complete liberation of the labour 
market, because it actually prescribed terms and requirements that put some 
restraint on the parties' agreed terms and conditions. The question for 
consideration however, is whether these requirements were simply responding 
to potential market failures and transaction costs thus actually ensuring 
efficiency, or were they implicitly or explicitly reflecting equity 
considerations? 
B Freedom of Association 
Part I of the ECA dealt with freedom of association and provided employees 
with the "freedom to chose whether or not to associate with other employees 
for the purpose of advancing the employee ' s collective interests."46 Despite 
the available freedom to work collectively, the ECA actually focused on de-
collectivism and decentralisation. The ECA reflected the neo-liberal economic 
focus on individuals' freedom of contract. Even the terminology used in the 
ECA, such as "employment contract" rather than the pervious vocabulary of 
"awards" and "agreements" reinforced the individualistic nature of the 
approach. What was previously known under earlier law as "blanket 
coverage," where entire industries were treated as a whole, was gone because it 
was in complete conflict with the concept of individual bargaining for efficient 
terms. 
45 Peter Brosnan and David Rea Rogernomics and the labour Market Victoria University of 
Wellington, Industrial Relations Centre, Wellington, 1992) 2. 
46 ECA 1991 , s5(a) . 
I Collectivism remains but is not actively promoted 
The ECA consciously limited the compulsory power of unionism by clearly 
stipulating that no clause in an employment contract "shall require any person 
to be, or remain a member of any employees organisation."47 The ECA 
represented the concept of voluntary unionism and the impact of this was a 
drop in union membership from 51 % before the ECA to 19 % after. 48 The 
freeing up to allow individual bargaining certainly reflected the goal of 
efficiency and flexibility because the labour supply was fragmented into 
individuals who could agree on individual terms to reflect production. It could 
be argued that not outlawing unions altogether was an equitable consideration 
for those in the secondary market, however with largely decreased union 
representation resulting from the restrictive collective bargaining terms of the 
ECA, the result was not necessarily equitable. The reality became that many 
individuals did not have access to unions through which their bargaining power 
could be increased and other collective bargaining groups simply did not exist. 
2 What the International Labour Organisation thought 
It is of significance that the New Zealand Council of Trade Unions made a 
complaint to the International Labour Organisation ("ILO") that the ECA 
violated International Convention 87, relating to freedom of association and 
Convention 98 the right to organise and collectively bargain. The basis of the 
complaint was that the ECA did not promote collective bargaining, as the 
conventions required. The ILO accepted that the ECA did not promote 
collective bargaining and was in breach in the convention. However the 
National government did not change the legislation, effectively ignoring the 
finding and making the argument that the convention had never been ratified in 
New Zealand. 
47 ECA 1991 , s6(a). 
48 Gordon Campbell " Workers of the World" The Listener, Auckland New Zealand, 9-15 September 
2000, 29. 
C Bargaining 
Part II of the ECA provided for what amounts to a "largely unstructured 
regime for negotiation of employment contracts."49 In line with its goal of 
efficiency, the ECA moved away from compulsory arbitration by the State to 
bargaining only between the two parties to the contract, which was also more 
flexible. The contents of contracts under the ECA were largely to be 
determined by employers and employees or their authorised representatives. 
Individuals were no longer bound to representation by a union, if they wished 
to be represented by a bargaining agent they could select any representative. 
Interestingly when the drafting instructions for the ECA first went to the 
Department of Labour there was "the absence of an obligation upon employers 
to recognise the bargaining agent chosen by the employee."50 The Department 
of Labour expressed real concern that this would result in considerable 
procedural uncertainty and transaction costs to both parties. The uncertainty 
was portrayed in economic terms as transaction and compliance costs, but 
ensuring the existence of representation also inadvertently supported equitable 
concerns because it allowed employees in an inequitable bargaining position to 
be represented by someone at less of an information asymmetry, namely by a 
lawyer or specialist negotiator. While the existence of a representative 
bargaining agent was sold to the National government as a mechanism to 
address market failure, the effect has also been that there are equity gains 
through efficiency without any trade-off between the two. 
D Individual and Collective Contracts 
Part II of the ECA also described the nature of individual and collective 
employment contracts. 
49 Philip Bartlett, William Cromwell-Hodge, Phillipa Muir, Christopher Toogood Employment 
Contracts (Brookers, Wellington, 1991) EC.02. 
50Harbridge, above n34, 19. 
1 Individual Contracts 
There were no obligations under the ECA regarding the structure of an 
individual contract, which also allowed for complete flexibility. Individual 
employment contracts were not even required to be in writing unless an 
employee so requested. 51 Equity, it could be argued however, was present in 
the nature of an obligation that "where there is an applicable collective 
employment contract, each employee and employer may negotiate terms and 
conditions on an individual basis that are not inconsistent with any terms and 
conditions of the applicable collective employment contract."52 This can also 
be described in efficiency terms as reducing transaction costs for employers 
who deal with both collective and individual contracts. 
2 Collective contracts 
The structure of collective contracts under the ECA had some very basic 
requirements, such as they needed to be in writing53 and the requirement that 
the employer must provide the employee with a copy.54 These requirements 
addressed in the writer's view, the potential for inefficient transaction costs 
and the information asymmetries that may have existed if the employee did 
not have a copy of the collective agreement. There are obvious expediency 
reasons for the need for a written contract in a collective situation. Without 
the collective contract in writing there are too many people who can have too 
many views of what was agreed, which could result in large compliance costs. 
Having the contract in writing also restricts transaction costs while parties' 
dispute about what was intended. Having the contract in writing and 
providing the employee with a copy was also more equitable because it meant 
that both parties were aware of its terms and could recognise when they were 
being broken. 
51 ECA 1991, sl9. 
52 ECA 1991 , sl9(2). 
53 ECA 1991 , s20(4). 
54 ECA 1991 , s20(5). 
E Personal Grievances 
Part III was one of the more extensive and prescriptive parts of the ECA. The 
object of Part III was set out in section 26, which suggested that efficiency 
rather than equity considerations were the reason for the prescriptive nature. 
Section 26 provided that one of the objectives was to establish that "all 
employment contracts must contain an effective procedure for the settlement 
of personal grievances." This is clearly regulation of what would otherwise be 
the parties ' individual choice of whether to have a grievance procedure in their 
contract. If a clause was not introduced into a contract, a standard clause on 
the procedure for settlement of personal grievances had to be adopted from the 
first schedule of the ECA. The requirement meant that what could otherwise 
be the time consuming matter of ongoing dispute about procedures was 
eliminated thus cutting down on compliance and transaction costs. Having to 
provide for grievance procedures also had an equitable impact because it 
ensured that the employees were aware of a pre-established procedure that 
could be relied upon and enforced in law. Without such a procedure an 
employee would find they had no established right to pursue the unjustifiable 
actions of the employer at law. 
A personal grievance could be brought against an employer in a number of 
situations including unjustifiable dismissal, unjustifiable action, discrimination 
and duress to join or for not joining an employee ' s group and sexual 
harassment. These amount to situations where an employer could use their 
power advantage to undertake certain actions that may not be considered fair 
or just. The personal grievance procedure allowed the employee the ability to 
tum to a third party to seek their view on the lawful and reasonableness of the 
employer' s action. Remedies could be sought ranging from reinstatement to 
reimbursement of lost wages and damages. The personal grievance 
procedures can be seen as both efficient and equitable because in ensuring the 
employee is treated fairly there is also an assurance that the parties are 
complying with the agreed contract and that it continues to be welfare 
enhancing for both parties. 
F Enforcement of Employment Contracts 
Part IV of the ECA set out a requirement that under law "employment 
contracts create enforceable rights and obligations."55 The terms of the 
contract that could be enforced in law were terms both explicit and implied. 
There has been much Court of Appeal commentary on the issue of introducing 
implied terms into employment contracts and largely a "strict" and arguably 
efficient approach was taken. In Air NZ v Raddock56 the Court of Appeal 
found that implied terms would not be imported into a contract contrary to 
express terms. There are obvious inefficiencies in implied terms in 
agreements because they are not terms that have necessarily been agreed to by 
the parties but have been imposed by a party outside of the contract. This 
approach can be seen to be inequitable because it does not allow the 
introduction of terms that are fairer for the weaker party if to do so 1s 
inconsistent with what may be an efficiently welfare enhancing agreement. 
G Strikes and Lock-outs 
Part V of the ECA provided for a very limited right to strike or lock-out at 
times outside of the existence of a current contract of employment. The ECA 
allowed for lawful strikes and lock-outs only where the strike or lock-out 
related to freedom of association, a personal grievance or where the strike or 
lock-out was concerned with the issue of whether a collective employment 
contract would bind more than one employer. 57 Strikes have been an issue of 
great debate across the political spectrum. The ECA's attempt to more or less 
outlaw strikes, which were part of the bargaining power of unions under the 
old regime, reflects the goal of productive efficiency. It is assumed that at 
times of strike that the output of the economy is not produced at the lowest 
cost because of lost production, and factors such as the cost of replacement 
staff. In economic terms when a strike takes place there are negative 
externalities effecting all parties involved as well as productivity, thus 
55 ECA 1991 , s43(a). 
56 Air NZv Raddock [1999] IERNZ 30 (CA). 
57 ECA 1991, s60(c)(i)-(iii). 
amounting to inefficiency. The massive restrictions on the ability to strike in 
the ECA can be argued to be inequitable because they removed a powerful 
tool in the balance of power between an employee and employer and lessened 
the bargaining power of the collective. 
The common law approach to strikes is restrictive because torts such as 
trespass and interference with economic action mean that those organising or 
participating in strikes could be liable for losses that resulted. The ECA 
therefore provided a lawful power to strike at certain restricted times that 
meant that the Common Law causes of action could not be applied at that 
time. The limited scope of lawful strikes meant there was no protection from 
the Common Law remedies if an unlawful strike took place, meaning that 
strikes could take place only when an agreed contract was not in existence and 
for a limited number of reasons. 
H Institutions 
The ECA did not eliminate specialised employment institutions, which would 
have been entirely consistent with the its neo-liberal economic philosophy. 
Part VI of the Act created two institutions, the Employment Tribunal and the 
Employment Court. A limited right of appeal to the Court of Appeal existed 
on points of law. Ironically the ECA extended the coverage of the 
Employment Court from not only those under collective contracts (as was the 
case under the LRA) but to all employees including those on individual 
contracts. This meant that: 
on one hand the Act deregulate[ d] the process of contract 
negotiation, by disestablishing mechanisms which regulate trade 
union representation and contract negotiation. On the other hand 
institutional arrangements philosophically consistent with this were 
rejected in favour of retaining the specialist labour law 
jurisdiction.58 
58 Harbridge, above n34, 13-14. 
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1 Separating institutions from the rest 
After the 1990 election the National Party were desperate to get the ECA 
enacted, but the issue of what should be done with the specialist labour courts 
had not been fully considered. The way around this for the Minister of Labour, 
the Hon Max Bradford was to propose that the ECA should be introduced in a 
two step process, with issues relating to the specialist institutions being 
considered in the second part. However as policy work developed it became 
increasingly clear that approaching matters in two stages would not allow for a 
complete policy debate on all the relevant issues and the two-stage approach 
was rejected. 
2 The Department of Labour on specialist institutions 
When the National Party asked the Department of Labour to comment on what 
it saw as the necessary role of the State in the facilitation of the employment 
relationship, one of the issues they raised was the importance of a specialist 
labour law institution. The Department of Labour stated that: 
to provide no specialist industrial relations institutions runs the risk 
that the State has no capacity (short of some form of one-off 
legislative intervention) to influence bargaining behaviour. On the 
other hand, the establishment of some institutional presence signals 
publicly that the State has some interest in constraining excessive 
bargaining behaviours and promoting industrial harmony.
59 
This approach would be seen by the strict "new-right" as efficiency being 
traded off for equity considerations. 
3 The New Right on specialist institutions 
Epstein, who represented the theory behind the strict "new-right" approach 
held the view on specialist institutions, that the bias developed by a specialist 
59Harbridge, above 34, 20- 21. 
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court outweighs any positives from having a specialist institution. He stated 
that "while legal cases will undoubtedly differ in subject matter, in all 
instances the goal is a set of rules that will maximise the business efficiency of 
the transaction. "60 In his view this can only be achieved by using a judge who 
is experienced in dealing with all sorts of market transactions. Eventually 
however the National Party was swayed by the equitable and efficiency 
arguments of the Department of Labour and specialist institutions remained 
intact. 
I Contractor or Employee 
The ECA defined an employment contract as "a contract of service. "61 The 
Common Law distinction between a contract for service and a contract for 
services was therefore preserved by the ECA, with the rights of an employee 
existing only for those who acted under a contract for service. The rights 
available to an employee with a contract for service included enforceable 
rights under the ECA but also rights under the minimum code. In the leading 
case on the distinction between a contract for service and a contract for 
services, Cunningham v TNT, 62 the Court of Appeal held that the question of 
whether an owner-driver was an employee was to be approached as a matter of 
interpretation of contract alone. Though the amount of control that the 
employer had over the individual was a relevant consideration it was not an 
entirely persuasive factor. 
The Court of Appeal rejected arguments in the Cunningham v TNT case that 
advocated for a "shift of policy in favour of the Courts emphasising the 
desirability of employee protection in interpreting the nature of contractual 
arrangements, even to the extent of defeating the original intentions of the 
· · ,,63 contractmg parties. 
60Employment Law: Courts and Contracts , above n33 , 4-5. 
61 ECA 1991 , s2 . 
62 Cunningham v TNT[l993] I ERNZ 956; [1993] 2 NZLR 681 (CA). 
63 Bartlett, above n49, EC 2.12.06. 
The strict contractual approach in the case was beneficial to those who made 
the conscious decision to be contractors rather than employees because of the 
potential freedom and financial gains (largely those in the primary market) and 
buyers of labour. However the effect of the Cunningham v TNT decision was 
not necessarily so beneficial in the secondary sector where those with lessened 
bargaining power and no collective support, might be forced to sign up to 
contracts that are effectively contracts for services. The judicial focus on the 
contents of the contract alone would support the interpretation that they had no 
enforceable employee rights including the minimum code. This strict 
contractual approach can be seen as inequitable because it does not take into 
account the surrounding circumstances that may reflect that it was only 
because of the employees reduced bargaining power that they became a 
contractor. 
J Is it a Free-Market and is it Efficient? 
The ECA did not amount to a free labour market framework. In reality the 
ECA had many prescriptive aspects that required the incorporation of 
provisions into employment contracts and supported the existence of specialist 
labour institutions. Many of the prescriptive provisions can be explained in 
terms of ensuring that efficiency is not lost due to transaction costs, or other 
market failures such as lack of competition. However many of these can also 
be explained in equitable terms and while that is not necessarily the object of 
the ECA, it can not be denied that some equitable considerations existed in the 
ECA. That is not to say that the ECA is market regulation aimed solely at 
achieving social justice, but it does contain some equitable considerations, 
some explicit, others implicitly existent through parallel efficiency 
considerations. 
I What has been achieved? 
Kasper has proclaimed that the ECA was a "success from the viewpoint of 
efficiency growth, job creation, and equity of opportunity and fits within New 
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Zealand's overall economic order. It is therefore efficient."64 So, is Kasper 
right, did the ECA obtained its objective of efficiency? The National Party is 
of the view that the ECA obtained its objective over the 9 years it was in effect. 
The Hon Max Bradford stated that: 
since the Act was passed in law the benefits of flexibility have 
been clearly apparent. New Zealand has experienced 
impressive growth and growth in peoples ' incomes. The 
economic reforms since 1990 have given many unemployed 
people new jobs. Since 1991 employment has risen by over 
256,000.65 
National also states that there has been a saving of over $40 million annually in 
what was previously lost wages during strikes. 
2 Labour on the ECA 
According to the Labour Party the measure to determine efficiency is labour 
productivity and, in their view, labour productivity has decreased under the 
ECA. Labour states that "according to official Reserve Bank estimates, the 
average annual increase in Labour productivity between 1991 and 1999 was an 
astounding 0.36%"66 compared to a figure of 2% for the years 1987-1990 
under the LRA. The Labour Party further points out that the ECA produced a 
low growth, import driven economy meaning the gap between rich and poor in 
New Zealand has widened. This can also be described, in the writer's view, as 
the growing divide between the primary and secondary sectors of the labour 
market. 
While the National Party is able to claim success in terms of flexibility, leading 
to efficient business returns and an increase in employment, it is Labour' s view 
64 Kasper, above n 13 , 52. 
65 Hon Max Bradford "National ' s Labour Market Policy" 24(2) NZJIR 155-165, 156. 
66 The Employment Relations Bill Explained para 5 at <http ://www.labo ur.orq .nz/erb/e rb2tf.html> 
(last accessed 20 July 2000). 
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that a large portion of those jobs were in fact casual, part-time or very lowly 
paid (possibly below the minimum wage if they were contractors). It is the 
writer's contention that the ECA made the primary labour market more 
efficient and flexible for suppliers in that market and employers in general. It 
is proposed however that the effect in the secondary market has not been as 
positive. This is because the effect of the reduction in collective bargaining 
has meant that the bargaining power of those in the secondary market has been 
reduced. Furthermore the definition of "contract of employment" has worked 
to exclude some secondary market suppliers from the rights of employees. 
Therefore it is argued that while efficiency may have resulted, inequity has also 
resulted for some suppliers in the secondary market who have reduced 
bargaining power and are not in demand. 
VIII THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS ACT AND THE OBJECT OF 
FAIRNESS 
The Employment Relations Bill (ERB) had its first reading in the House of 
Representatives on 16 March 2000. It was then referred to the Employment 
and Accident Insurance Legislation Committee, which received 17,369 
submissions regarding its content. On 16 August 2000 the ERB was passed 
and became law. The ERA came into effect on 2 October 2000. 
A The Object of the ERA 
The object of the ERA is set out here in full because of its significance: 
The object of this Act is-
(a) To build productive employment relationships through 
the promotion of mutual trust and confidence in all 
aspects of the employment environment and the 
employment relationship; 
(i) by recogmsmg that employment 
relationships must be built on good faith 
behaviour; and 
(ii) by acknowledging and addressing the 
inherent inequality of the bargaining 
power in employment relationships; and 
(iii) by promoting collective bargaining; and 
(iv) by protecting the integrity of individual 
choice; and 
(v) by promoting mediation as the primary 
problem-solving mechanism; and 
(vi) by reducing the need for judicial intervention. 
(b) to promote observance in New Zealand of the 
principles underlying International Labour 
Organisation Convention 87 on Freedom of 
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Association, and convention 98 on the Right to 
Organise and Bargain Collectively. 
67 
The object is not as concise as that of the ECA, with its one line catch phrase, but 
that is because the Labour Party has approached the regulation of the labour 
market somewhat differently from the National Party. The Hon Margaret Wilson 
described this change in approach when she stated that the: 
the Employment Relations Bill signals a new focus in employment 
relationships rather than the purely economic and contractual 
relations envisaged under the present legislation. The fundamental 
difference between the Bill and the Employment Contracts Act is 
that the Bill is based in the understanding that the employment 
relationship is a human relationship, which, like other human 
relationships, functions best in an atmosphere of mutual trust, 
confidence and fair dealings.68 
What then does it mean to say that the Act intends "to build productive 
employment relationships through the promotion of mutual trust and 
confidence in all aspects of the employment environment and the employment 
relationship"? Is this an equitable or efficient goal, or is it both? These 
questions can be answered by considering some of the fundamental concepts in 
the ERA. 
B Good Faith 
One of the fundamental and arguably the most significant concepts behind the 
ERA is the concept of good faith . Productive employment relationships, 
according to the ERA, will be built on several factors including "recognising 
that employment relationships must be built on good faith behaviour." 
However before the ERA was passed there was considerable hype from the 
67 ERA 2000, s3 . 
68 Hon Margaret Wilson, Minister of Labour Address to Rudd Watts and Stone, Employment Relations 
Bill, Wellington, 29 March 2000. 
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National and Act parties suggesting that good faith bargaining would amount 
to inefficiency not productivity. 
Henry Dinsdale, a Canadian labour law specialist brought to New Zealand by 
the Employers Federation, made the statement that while good faith had been 
introduced in the United States of America and Canada to affirm the existence 
of unions, the effect has been that "the law has led to the US Government 
dictating not only that the parties must try and reach a collective agreement, 
but what it is that they are bargaining about."69 This image of good faith 
bargaining amounting to State intervention in the employment relationship 
through the backdoor does not accurately reflect the intended effect of good 
faith bargaining in a New Zealand context. The ERA specifically states that 
the duty of good faith does not require a concluded collective employment 
contract 70 and no terms in the ERA suggest that the concept is intended to 
relate to content rather than process. What then is "good faith" likely to mean 
in the New Zealand labour relations context?71 
I Analogy with consumer law 
Section 4 of the ERA describes in some detail the principle that parties in an 
employment relationship "must deal with each other in good faith." While not 
limited by the interpretation, "good faith" requires that a party to an 
employment relationship must not "whether directly or indirectly do anything 
(i) to mislead or deceive each other; or (ii) that is likely to mislead or deceive 
each other." If the obligation sounds familiar, that is because it is the same 
69 Brookers Employment News Service for 22 May 2000 New Zealand Employers Federation Media 
Release 21 May 2000. 
70 ERA 2000, s33 . 
71 It is interesting to note that as part of the coalition agreement between National and New Zealand 
First after the election in 1996 there was an agreement reached, to introduce an obligation for "fair 
bargaining" into employment relationships. At that time National was at pains to ensure that people 
were clear that this was not the same thing as the Canadian or American obligation of good faith. 
"Fair bargaining" as proposed in the coalition agreement never saw the light of day with the breaking 
apart of the coalition. 
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standard stipulated in the Fair Trading Act 1986, where parties should not 
conduct themselves in a manner that is likely to mislead or deceive. The 
comparison with consumer law is an interesting one because it highlights one 
of the significant efficiency considerations behind the concept of good faith, 
namely market failures associated with information asymmetries. The 
assumption has been made by many that good faith is all about equity, but it is 
clear that the concept is also intended to ensure that information asymmetries 
that may allow one party to mislead or deceive the other do not result in 
inefficiency. As is further discussed in this paper addressing information 
asymmetries also becomes important as an issue of determining how the gains 
from trade will be divided. 
2 What will good faith apply to? 
Section 4 of the ERA provides a list of the type of interactions, to which the 
obligation of good faith will apply, ranging from bargaining collective 
contracts to consultation and access to the workplace. The obligation is far 
reaching in that it will attach to most interactions between the collective 
bargaining parties but it is not intended to impact on the content or outcome of 
any negotiations, discussions or communications. 
(a) Addressing the information asymmetry 
In terms of collective bargaining there is an obligation that: 
The union and employer must provide to each other, on request 
and in accordance with section 34, information that is reasonably 
necessary to support or substantiate claims or responses to claims 
made for the purposes of the bargaining. 72 
This is in direct recognition of the efficiency considerations relating to 
information asymmetry in the market and attempts to address situations where 
one party can deceive the other based on the fact that the other party is not 
72 ERA 2000, s35. 
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fully informed. The area where this will have the most significant impact is 
where employers claim they can not increase wages because there are no 
available funds to do so. Under the ERA the employer will now have to 
provide information to back up this claim. Previously under the ECA there 
was no requirement to prove any such claim. 
This requirement to provide details of profits and expenditure is seen by 
National and Act as entirely a social justice goal, at the cost of efficiency. 
However it is interesting to note that "as long ago as 1956, the US Supreme 
Court, not a Kremlin front organisation ruled that an employers refusal to 
substantiate, say a claim of inability to pay increase wages, could violate laws 
of good faith bargaining."73 The reality is that there are likely to be more 
equitable distributions of the gains from trade if employers are required to 
provide this information but there is also likely to be more efficiency because 
the parties have more information. This obligation to provide information is 
in the nature of a request and can be made by an employer to a union and vice 
versa. If there is a real concern about the confidential nature of the 
information then it can be released to a "independent reviewer." 74 They can 
make a determination on the confidential nature of the information and then if 
it is found to be confidential "advise the union and employer concerned of the 
decision in a way that maintains the confidentiality of the information."75 This 
means that there is an ability to preserve the confidential nature of information 
but that parties will no longer be able to hide behind claims that they can not 
substantiate with fact. 
(b) Good faith in individual employment agreements 
The good faith obligations discussed above do not apply to the individual 
contracting situation where it could be argued that the information asymmetry 
and potential inequities are greater than when there is a collective agreement. 
Campbell , above n48, 30 . 
74 ERA 2000, s34(4). 
75 ERA 2000, s34(6). 
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However the information asymmetry in an individual situation is addressed in 
other ways, namely by the requirement that the individual who is not a union 
member be covered by the collective, if one exists, for the first 30 days. 76 If 
there is no collective contract in existence the employer must provide the 
individual with a copy of the intended contract and advise the employee that 
they can seek advice on it.77 In the context of an individual relationship, good 
faith behaviour is broadly described as being "promoted by providing 
protection against unfair bargaining" and is considered as "consistent with the 
implied term of mutual trust and confidence between employee and 
employer." 78 Therefore the issue of honest dealings is a theme for all types of 
good faith behaviour. 
3 The Code of Good Faith 
A draft code of good faith has been produced by the Interim Good Faith Code 
Committee and reinforces that good faith surrounds the processes associated 
with collective bargaining rather than the content. 79 The draft code, intended 
to be a generic code, includes such concepts as recognition of the role and 
authority of representatives, the development of an agreed bargaining 
processes and the nature of meetings to take place between the parties. The 
code is intended to provide guidance to employers and unions on what good 
faith behaviour is in bargaining a collective agreement and acts to facilitate a 
framework within which the parties have more equitable bargaining power but 
also addresses efficiency issues because transaction costs are reduced by the 
impact of a predetermined framework. 
76 ERA 2000, s63 . 
77 ERA 2000, s64. 
78 ERA 2000, s60. 
79 
See <http ://www.ssc.govt.nz/documents/code good faith bargaining agreement.htrn> (last 
accessed 14 September 2000). 
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4 Why are parties required to act in good faith? 
A significant question for consideration is why the requirement of good faith 
is actually required as a statutory obligation. Wouldn't the parties act in good 
faith without regulatory requirement? The answer to that question has to be 
"maybe." While parties may participate in some procedural good faith 
behaviour without a regulatory requirement, much of the reason behind good 
faith bargaining is to try and avoid the "take it or leave it" approach to 
bargaining. It is this aspect of good faith bargaining that is not necessarily 
complied with without regulatory intervention. Parties it seems will act to 
preserve the position that results in the best division of trade for them. The 
party that ends up with the best result will be the party with the most 
bargaining power. If there is little or no competition, or there is over supply of 
labour or one party has most of the relevant information then they are likely to 
be able to tell the other party that they can take or leave an offer, as they have 
little or no motivation to act otherwise. 
An obligation to act in good faith has been found to have been implied in the 
employment contract for some time and in New Zealand Institute v State 
Services Commission it was stated that "there can be no doubting the existence 
of a duty to bargain in good faith as between parties to an existing contract of 
employment. 80 However this applied only to existing employment 
relationships rather than those being entered into and there was no certainty 
about what was required by any such implied obligation, making it difficult to 
enforce and meaning compliance was more or less voluntary. The statutory 
stipulation and development of the code of good faith means that what is 
meant by good faith is made clear and it can therefore be enforced with some 
certainty 
C Inherent Inequality in Bargaining Power to be recognised 
The ERA assumes that there 1s a need to recogmse that those m the 
80 [1995] 2ERNZ 339, at 349. 
employment relationship have unequal bargaining power and that the 
employee is at a bargaining disadvantage, therefore requiring assistance from 
the State. The ERA delivers this in many ways, but most notably through the 
promotion of collective bargaining and the statutory recognition of unions as 
the sole collective bargaining agent. 
1 The recognition of the collective group and unions 
The rationale behind the ERA is that in the collective group the individual 
worker will find the strength to get a better share of the gains of trade. The re-
introduction of statutory recognition of collective bargaining is hailed by those 
who do not support the ERA, as a step back in time, amounting to compulsory 
unionism and union monopoly. This approach seems to ignore the fact that 
there are a number of ways to effectively opt out of collective bargaining 
either by having an individual contract of employment or by becoming an 
independent contractor. 
Furthermore it is difficult to see how any union will have a monopoly when 
union power is contestable, with any 15 people able to set up an incorporated 
society able to become a registered union. 81 It is the writer's contention that 
what the ERA has actually done in reintroducing the promotion of collective 
bargaining is support the secondary market by increasing their bargaining 
power. However the bargaining power imbalance that the ERA 
acknowledges in section 3 does not in fact exist for all employees. As has 
been discussed in this paper, in the primary sector where employees may 
chose to be on individual contracts and to contract out of the employment 
relationship to enjoy the benefits of contracting, the bargaining power is not 
necessarily unequal. In that situation there is arguably little or no bargaining 
imbalance. The ERA does not restrict this groups freedom to act individually. 
81 ERA 2000, sl3 . 
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2 ERA not a mirror of the past 
The ERA is not a mirror of the strict regulatory regime, that existed in varying 
incarnations before the labour market was "freed" by the ECA, when varying 
degrees of compulsory unionism existed. It represents a balance of collective 
and individual interests, employer and employee interests and secondary and 
primary market interests. The Hon Margaret Wilson made the point when the 
ERA was still a Bill, that: 
the Bill has not gone back to the days when compulsory unionism, 
national awards, and compulsory arbitration were the three legs on 
which the system stood ........ The Employment Relations Act is the 
way of the future. It will work in practice for business. It will 
work in practice for employees ..... Good faith and the honest open 
communication that is the corollary and consequence will improve 
productivity and confidence throughout New Zealand.82 
The ERA does not therefore address the issue of inequality of bargaining 
power by assuming that all employees require the protection of the collective 
group, it leaves room for employees to make choices about representation that 
ensure efficiency of outcome as well as equity. 
D Employee or not Employee, that is the Question? 
Another significant concept in the ERA is the manner in which it deals with 
who is and is not an employee. The ERB that went to the Select Committee 
had the following definition of employee: 
82 Brookers above nl2, 3. 
(1) In this Act, unless the context otherwise 
requires, employee-
(a) means any person of any age 
employed by the employer to do any 
work for hire or reward under a 
contract of service; and 
(b) includes 
(i) a home worker; or 
(ii) a person intending to work 
(2) in deciding whether a person (person A) is employed by 
another person (Person B)-
(a) a primary consideration is the extent to which 
the work that person A does under the 
agreement, contract, or arrangement and how 
and when person A does the work is-
(i) subject to the control and direction 
of person B; or 
(ii) integrated into person B ' s business 
or affairs; or 
(iii) both; and 
(b) The court or authority (as the case may be) must, 
among the other matters that the Court or 
Authority takes into account, give less weight to 
anything in an agreement, contract, or 
arrangement that, expressly or by implication---
(i) describes person A as a contractor or 
independent contractor; or 
(ii) describers the agreement, contract, 
or arrangement as an agreement, 
contract, or arrangement for 
services; or 
(iii) provides that the relationship 
between person A and person B is 
not that of an employee and 
employer. 83 
This definition sent shock waves through many organisations that employed 
independent contractors for specific jobs or on an ongoing basis and to whom 
no employee benefits were paid and no minimum code is applied. The 
83 ERA 2000, s6. 
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definition was particularly problematic for those agencies that organised for 
the contracting out of individuals to organisations, on the basis that they were 
self-employed contractors. They were concerned that what was a contractual 
relationship would need to become an employment relationship. 
I To protect the secondary market 
The Select Committee commented that the policy intent of the definition of 
"employee" in the ERB was intended to "stop some employers labelling 
individuals as "contractors" to avoid responsibility for employee rights such as 
holiday pay and minimum wages."84 The concern therefore was for those in 
the secondary market where there is less competition, less mobility and an 
inherent imbalance of bargaining power. What Labour were trying to avoid 
was the situation where an employee is forced to be an independent contractor 
so that the employer can avoid compliance with employee rights. The images 
of the sweatshop and pizza delivery drivers, already mentioned in this paper, 
are relevant examples of avoiding such obligations by treating employees as 
contractors. 
2 Objection from the primary market 
The objection to the definition of "employee" largely came from those in the 
primary market that wished to opt out of the employment relationship in order 
to get better conditions and payment. The Select Committee went on to say 
that these primary sector groups considered that "clause 6 would alter 
mutually beneficial relationships, overrule the intention of the parties, increase 
business costs, and create uncertainty."85 The Select Committee believed the 
answer was to clarify the provision to ensure that the policy intent was clear. 
The ERA is aimed at protecting those who are likely to be forced to be 
contractors by employers hoping to avoid minimum code obligations rather 
84 Employment and Accident Insurance Committee Report on Employment Relations Bill page 3 at < 
http: 1/www.gp.eo.nz/wooc/bills/erb/comm-2.html >( last accessed 15 August 2000). 
85 Employment and Accident Insurance Committee, above n83, 3. 
than restrict those in the pnmary market from electing to opt out of 
employment relationships where there are mutually beneficial results. 
3 Who is an employee under the ERA? 
After changes were made as a result of the Select Committee process, section 
6 of the ERA now acknowledges specific legislation that covers those that are 
contractors such as real estate agents and share-milkers86 and explicitly draws 
a distinction between the needs of those in the primary and secondary labour 
market sectors. The Employment Relations Authority and the Employment 
Court still have the ability to determine the real nature of the relationship, but 
must now consider: 
(a)all relevant matters, including any matters that indicate the 
intention of the persons; and 
(b) is not to treat as a determining matter any statement by the 
persons that describes the nature of the relationship.87 
The ERA allows the Court or Authority to make a declaration on application 
from a relevant party whether or not they are an employee for the purposes of 
any of the Acts listed in s223, which includes the Equal Pay Act 1972, the 
Holidays Act 1981, the Minimum Wage Act 1983, the Volunteers 
Employment Protection Act 1973, and the Wages Protection Act 1983. 
The ERA therefore does not restrict the contracting out of those in the primary 
market but it is aimed at protecting those individuals forced to be contractors 
in the secondary market. This means that the policy goals of efficiency and 
equity have resulted from an implicit acknowledgement of the different needs 
of different sectors of the labour market. 
86 The ERA 2000 has no effect on the Real Estate Agents Act 1976 or the Sharemilking Agreements 
Act 1937. 
87 ERA 2000, s6(3)(a) and (b). 
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E Fixed Term Contracts 
Another significant concept in terms of the ERA' s equity and efficiency 
content is the issue of fixed term contacts. The Select Committee commented 
that clause 81 of the ERB as it related to fixed term contractors, "caused 
considerable confusion and concern. In particular, employers were concerned 
that an initially sensible/justified decision to offer a fixed term contract could 
be subject to challenge on the basis that the circumstances had changed."88 
Clause 81 of the ERB originally stated that: 
( 1) An employee and an employer may agree that the 
employment of the employee will end 
(a) at the close of a specified date or period: 
(b) on the occurrence of a specified event: 
( c) at the conclusion of a specified project: 
(2) An employee whose employment comes to an end 
under subsection (1 )(a) is to be treated as having been 
dismissed unjustifiably unless that employee ' s 
employer establishes that: 
(a) at the time that the date or period was 
specified, there were genuine reasons for 
doing so relating to the employer ' s operational 
requirements; and 
(b) at the close of the date or period specified, the 
employer considered that those reasons 
continued to apply. 
There was concern expressed by those who employed fixed term contractors 
that this provision meant that there was no certainty in hiring employees on 
fixed term contracts and that there would be less flexibility for employers. 
The Select Committee recommended change in response to these concerns and 
the respective provision in the ERA, s66 now reads as : 
88 Employment and Accident Insurance Committee, above n83 , 9. 
(2) Before an employee and employer agree that the 
employment of the employee will end in a way 
specified in subsection (1) the employer must-
(a) have genuine reasons based on reasonable 
grounds for specifying that the employment of 
the employees is to end in that way; and 
(b) advise the employee of when and how his or 
her employment will end and the reasons for 
his or her employment ending in this way. 
(3) The following reasons are not genuine reasons for the 
purposes of subsection (2)(a): 
(a) to exclude or limit the rights of the employee under this 
Act: 
(b) to establish the suitability of the employee for 
permanent employment 
The changes that have been made are clearly in recognition of the goals of 
efficiency and flexibility but equity remains. The provisions now suggest that 
so long as the process is fair in terms of advising the contractor of their status 
and that there is a genuine reason for the end of the contact, then it is not 
unjustifiable dismissal when it ends. A fixed term contract can therefore 
continue to be welfare enhancing for both parties. While the original clause 
was equitable in approach, by ensuring that there was no exploitation of fixed 
term contractors to enable employers to avoid their employment obligations. 
The final clause reaches a balance between equitable and efficiency interests 
allowing parties that are in positions of equitable bargaining power to reach 
mutually beneficial agreement to have a contract for only a fixed period. 
F Personal Grievances 
Under the ERA the grounds on which a personal grievance can be raised have 
been expanded to include racial harassment in the work place. The ninety-day 
rule for the lodging of a personal grievance continues as under the ECA but 
there are exceptions specified for when this rule does not apply, including the 
equitable ground that the employee's agreement did not explain the 90 day 
89 
rule. 89 Therefore the personal grievance aspects of the ERA are not unlike 
those that existed under the ECA and the concept continues more or less 
unchanged to provide a combination of equitable and efficiency considerations 
as discussed above in relation to the ECA. 
G Strikes and Lockouts 
Strikes are seen by the "new right" as incredibly inefficient because of the 
flow-on effect strikes have for the employer and the economy as a whole. 
However little has changed under the ERA to cause the "new-right" concern, 
rather the law relating to strikes has merely been slightly enhanced. The 
concern most often expressed by the "new-right" about the ERA's strike 
provisions is the return of the ability of employees to strike in support of 
multi-employer bargaining. However as Hughes has pointed out "few 
employees in New Zealand (Nurses? Supermarket workers?) are in a position 
to pursue a multi-employer agreement."90 Therefore the impact of 
reintroducing such a provision may be of little practical effect. 
While the ERA has not done away with striking to ensure efficiency prevails, 
it has provided for some mechanism to lessen the effect of a strike on an 
employer and the economy as a whole. One of the significant mechanisms is 
the requirement to notify of a strike relating to an essential service some 14 
days in advance for some services and 3 days for others. This will obviously 
lessen the impact of the strike and removes the information asymmetry that 
exists for the employer. There is also a power to replace striking employees 
within certain limitations (namely that they already work for the employer, or 
it is necessary on health and safety grounds)91 which is in direct recognition of 
efficiency grounds. There is also the ability to suspend non-striking 
employees where work is not available during a strike leading to productive 
ERA 2000, sl 15. 
9° Campbell, above n48, 30. 
91 ERA 2000, s97. 
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efficiency.92 Therefore it can not be said that the strike provisions have not 
taken some efficiency considerations into account. 
H New Institutions 
Under the ERA there are three separate institutions, a Mediation Service, the 
Employment Relations Authority and the Employment Court. The objective 
section relating to institutions, includes recognition that the institutions will 
"support successful employment relationships and the good faith obligation 
that underpin them. "93 One of the most significant objectives of Part X of the 
ERA is that it aims to "recognise that, if problems in employment 
relationships are to be resolved promptly, expert problem-solving support, 
information and assistance needs to be available at short notice to the parties 
in those relationships."94 This reflects a desire to be both efficient and fair 
through ensuring that information asymmetries are rectified by the provision 
of information to both parties and the existence of a specific labour law 
jurisdiction. There is an interesting balance here of equity and efficiency 
gains and a clear recognition that "procedures for problem solving need to be 
fl "bl ,,95 ex1 e. 
1 Mediation 
Mediation services are going to be provided through a variety of means 
including telephone, fax, internet, e-mail, the services of providing general 
information about employment and services available, services to promptly 
resolve problems and assistance on fixing new terms if required. The ERA 
also places an emphasis on resolving matters at this lower level and supports 
private mediation even before going to the Mediation service. 
92 ERA 2000, s88. 
93 ERA 2000, sl43(a). 
94 ERA 2000, s143(c). 
95 ERA 2000, s143(d). 
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2 Employment Relations Authority 
While the Employment Relations Authority effectively replaces the 
Employment Tribunal there is a change in the modus operandi of the 
institution. This institution will have very board inquisitorial powers, as well 
as making determinations according to the substantial merits of the case. 96 
Changes were made at the Select Committee stage where a statement was 
introduced to the ERA that the Authority must "comply with the principles of 
natural justice. 97 Amongst the new-right there is concern that this Authority 
has powers that are too broad including some powers traditionally reserved for 
the High Court. Of further concern was the fact that the Employment 
Authority members need not be legally trained or hold a practising certificate 
of any kind. These fears seem to reflect a concern that the members may be 
too equitable and apply fairness considerations in determining the outcomes of 
cases and therefore not take efficiency considerations into account in their 
decision making. 
3 Employment Court 
The Employment Court continues with similar a jurisdiction and powers to 
those that existed under the ECA. Matters that are removed to the 
Employment Court for consideration from the Authority either during the 
hearing or after a determination has been made are heard, may at the Court' s 
direction be heard de novo. This may be done if the Court is satisfied that 
the applicant has participated in the Employment Authority ' s investigation in a 
way that was designed to resolve the issues, in other words of they have tried 
to resolve matters in good faith . 
96 ERA 2000, sl57 . 
97 ERA 2000, S 173. 
I What will the ERA Achieve in Terms of Equity? 
Papers ascertained from the Department of Labour and Treasury, by way of the 
Official Information Act 1982, include comments that suggest the ERA is 
likely to have the overall effect of producing "a labour market that functions in 
a manner that is fairer for workers, and also redistributes more in favour of 
workers on lower incomes."98 The philosophy behind the ERA clearly reflects 
the "social justice" reasons for regulation of the labour market and the aim of a 
fairer division of the gains from trade. It also allows for flexibility for those 
who wish to have an individual contract or contract out of the employment 
relationship, meaning efficiency considerations are also present. 
It is the writer's belief that the ERA amounts to an Act that reflects a 
consciousness of the dual labour market in offering the equitable objectives of 
collective bargaining and centralised unions to those in the secondary market 
(where they have less bargaining power because of lack of competition, 
immobility and information asymmetries) but also allows for flexibility and 
efficiency in the primary market. Therefore the answer of what it will 
achieve in terms of equity, is that any equity gains may result in the secondary 
market. For those in the primary market who do not need the protection of 
equitable provisions that may in fact act to restrict their desired flexibility, the 
flexibility of a market orientated system remains. The writer proposes that the 
ERA was written in contemplation of the fact that restrictive labour market 
regulation would not have a beneficial effect on the labour market or the 
economy as a whole and therefore balanced the interests of the different parts 
of the market, the goals of equity and efficiency and the interests of the 
employee and employer. 
98 Ministry of Labour Briefing Paper to the Minister of Labour Labour Market Impacts of Policy 
Reforms, 14 February 2000. 
IX CONCLUSION- WILL FAIRNESS KILL EFFICIENCY? 
The answer to the question whether the fairness considerations introduced by 
the ERA will eliminate efficiency has to be answered, in the writer's opinion, 
in the negative. The Department of Labour has indicated that it believes the 
ERA is intended to "promote a better balance of fairness over efficiency 
concerns in the employment relationship."99 It is the writer's view that this is 
indeed the case, but that in doing so the ERA has not sacrificed efficiency 
considerations for those who have a strong bargaining position in the 
employment relationship, namely those in the primary market. 
The ERA recognises there is a dual labour market and in doing so is able to 
balance the interests of both segments of the market. Therefore exploitation of 
those in the secondary market is avoided because they have the availability of 
protection from collective bargaining. The freedom to act as an individual 
remains an option for those in the primary sector. The writer proposes that a 
balance of equity and efficiency considerations exist in the ERA and agrees 
with the view that in comparing the ERA to the legislation of Europe and the 
United States of America that "over all, no other country has tried to balance 
the rights of the collective with the rights of the individual quite as finely as in 
New Zealand." 100 
The ECA did allow for more flexibility in the labour market by moving away 
from the constraints of the previous legislation with its compulsory obligations 
and direct State intervention. However the ECA did not address the fact that 
what was efficient for one segment of the market (the primary sector and 
employers) may be inequitable to the other (the secondary sector). While the 
ECA contained some equity gains through efficiency and in fact contained 
some aspects explicitly reflecting equitable policy goals the singular goal of 
promoting an "efficient labour market" did come at a cost to equity. The ECA 
99 Briefing Paper from Department of Labour to Minister of Labour Employment Relations Bill-
Overview of Policy Issues 21 January 2000. 
100 
Campbell, above n48, 29. 
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did not recogmse that failures in the market such as lack of competition, 
immobility, lack of demand and information asymmetries meant those in the 
secondary market might be exploited without the protection of collective 
bargaining. Therefore it did not contain the same balance of equity and 
efficiency that the ERA provides. 
The writer concludes that the equity/efficiency trade-off frontier which is part 
of the political rhetoric surrounding the two Acts is not a helpful mechanism 
through which to measure the equity and efficiency content of the ECA and 
ERA. It is however a helpful mechanism for opposition parties to draw 
emotive imagery. The concepts of equity and efficiency are not mutually 
exclusive as the trade-off is used to suggest in political rhetoric. Often when 
one of these objectives is aimed for, the other also results without a trade-off 
between the two taking place. In many instances equity and efficiency require 
the same regulatory mechanisms for intervention because they seek the same 
ends. 
Goddard CJ suggested that equity and efficiency need not be mutually 
exclusive but could be gained simultaneously soon after the ECA was enacted. 
When looking at its Long Title of the ECA he said that the: 
overall objective is to promote an efficient labour market. To 
promote means to encourage, actively support and advance, and an 
efficient labour market I take to be one that works well. In the 
concept of efficiency there is something more than the ideal of 
harmony enshrined in previous labour legislation. However since 
efficiency contains also a connotation of productiveness the old 
notions and the new notions are not necessarily at odds with each 
other, for harmony may be thought to lead to productiveness and 
d · h h IOI pro ucttveness to en ance armony. 
101 Adams v A 1/iance Textiles (NZ) Ltd [ 1992] I ERNZ 982; ( 1991) 4 NZELC 95 , 423 at I 003. 
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It is the writer's view that the ERA better reflects the goal of harmony through 
productivity and productivity through harmony that the Chief Judge had hoped 
would result under the ECA. 
The rhetoric and language borrowed from the equity/efficiency trade-off has 
created a perception however that where equity exists there is no efficiency. 
The ECA specifically recognised some equity considerations and gained others 
inadvertently through efficiency goals that had the same effect. The ERA aims 
to provide a fairer outcome for those in the secondary market in a position of 
reduced bargaining power, but supports flexibility and efficiency for those in 
the primary market. It can not yet be known whether this acknowledgement 
of the differing needs of those in the dual labour market and the balancing of 
the needs of the individual and collective will bring the two sectors of the 
labour market closer together in terms of improved wages and conditions as a 
result of increased bargaining power. What can be said with some certainty at 
this point is that putting the humanism back in the employment relationship 
will not kill efficiency. 
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